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Abstract 
In the ever increasing complexity of defense acquisition, the traditional metrics for defense 
projects of cost, schedule, and performance are insufficient. This paper explores the concept 
of cost, schedule, and performance to determine if these three quintessential project 
management criteria are sufficient to serve as the guiding principles for defense project 
managers. The ever increasing complexity of the weapons system development environment, 
from the necessity for specialization to the intricacies of new technology, requires a broader 
view than that offered by cost, schedule, and performance. In squaring the project 
management circle, we must add a fourth variable, context, to provide focus. Because if we 
measure it, it will get done. 
Introduction 
This paper is an examination of the complexity of defense acquisition and its 
relationship to the measures of cost, schedule, and performance—the project management 
circle (see Figure 1). Rather than use the more traditional name of project management 
triangle (or triple constraint, or even the iron triangle), we refer to the concept as the project 
management circle. The circle recognizes the interrelationships, necessary equilibrium, and 
the influencing and balancing effects that these three variables provide. This paper seeks to 
demonstrate that these three variables are missing an important consideration that should 
be held in equal regard. Recognizing that fourth consideration will allow the circle to be 
squared. 
 
 The Project Management Circle 
Any discussion of cost, schedule, and performance must include the concept of 
project success as ultimately, cost, schedule, and performance are meant to ensure 
success. These three ideas form the heart of the concept of project management and are 
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seen as not only management concepts, but as the definition of success in project 
management. In fact, cost, schedule, and performance are the prevailing criteria used to 
evaluate project success in the U.S. Department of Defense, and indeed throughout the 
U.S. Government. Congress uses cost, schedule, and performance; the media tend to focus 
on cost, schedule, and performance; and the GAO almost exclusively uses cost, schedule, 
and performance to measure execution. This paper suggests that the cost, schedule, and 
performance paradigm, while still effective as a measure of managing programs, needs to 
be expanded or changed.  
The Problem 
The current practice of project management assumes a simple, structured, and 
stable environment where the basic ideas of cost, schedule, and performance are sufficient 
to capture the workings of weapons system development, as well as serving to define 
success. However, the DoD environment is complex, dynamic, and constantly changing, 
and defining success is problematic. In this 21st Century environment, the obligation of 
management in general and that of project managers specifically is to deal with complexity. 
Getting the system developed and fielded, regardless of complexity, is the focus of the 
project management effort.  
Simultaneously, while cost and schedule measures remain important, they are 
insufficient as measures of project success. Nevertheless, the management concepts of 
cost, schedule, and performance remain the same. We continue to manage and define 
success in acquisition using cost, schedule, and performance. While important measures, 
cost schedule, and performance are insufficient criteria for both program management and 
program success. This is the dilemma facing project managers today.  
The Approach 
The research seeks to examine the complexity of defense project management and 
relate that complexity to the key variables of cost, schedule, and performance. The intent is 
to explore other variables that will better help to explain DoD project success (or failure) and 
provide the DoD weapons system project manager the ability to manage more effectively. 
This research attempts to “square” the project management circle by identifying a fourth 
critical variable that must be addressed by project managers. The research methodology 
consists of a system-focused approach based on an extensive review of the literature of 
cost, schedule, and performance, and project complexity.  
The analysis consists of three parts. The first section will examine the concept of 
cost, schedule, and performance. The second section explores DoD project management 
complexity. Project success is also examined as it relates to complexity and defense 
acquisition.  
Lastly, a fourth variable, the concept of project management context, is introduced. 
We explore the idea of project context, identifying and categorizing the context of the 
defense project using a systems framework. The results of the analysis will identify those 
context variables that would contribute to a project management model addressing complex 
weapons systems development. The expected result is the identification of variables, 
beyond cost, schedule, and performance, that contribute to project success and enable the 
complex systems project manager to better address the management challenges evident in 
most DoD systems development. 
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Cost, Schedule & Performance 
Cost, schedule, and a third measure—performance, scope, or quality, among 
others—are as old as the practice of project management. Project managers apply 
management principles and knowledge to effect change. The Project Management Institute 
(PMI; n.d.) defines a project as “a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique 
product, service or result.” The temporary aspect emphasizes the limits of project 
management, the application of finite resources—both time (schedule) and budget (cost). 
The unique property underlines the focus and purpose of the project, as well as the result—
performance. No one would dispute the importance of these concepts, but are these criteria 
sufficient in today’s complex environment? The reality is projects in general, and complex 
projects in particular (including defense projects), are often completed late, over budget or 
both (Morris & Hough, 1988). 
While well known to the practice of project management, cost, schedule, and 
performance are elusive concepts in the context of the academic literature. Cost, schedule, 
and scope in the construction industry are prevalent, but cost, schedule, and performance 
as used in defense are not. Most research on cost, schedule, and performance generally 
focuses on the specifics of earned value and the mechanics of managing weapons systems 
projects (Atkinson, Crawford, & Ward, 2006; Aubry, Hobbs, & Thuillier, 2007; Gardiner & 
Stewart, 2000).  
The business of defense project management is to create a product—a system 
comprised of advanced technology for the most part, a weapons system (Gaddis, 1959). 
Defense project managers manage work (or scope), technology, people, interfaces and the 
overall system to ensure a viable result. Cost, schedule, and performance are metaphors for 
trade-offs. The project manager must manage many obvious and sometimes not so obvious 
constraints and trade those constraints against each other (Caccamese & Bragantini, 2012). 
This decision function is the essence of project management.  
Systems take inputs and transform those inputs into outputs. Mastery of project 
management requires recognition that the project is a system and that the “black box” 
(transformation) process of systems development sometimes produces unforeseen results 
(outputs). These unforeseen results include a continuum that ranges from success to failure 
in both capability and management. Figure 2 is an Integrated Definition for Function 
Modeling (IDEF0) representation of the system. Inputs are combined with resources to 
produce outputs. Controls are the constraints of the system; budget and time are most often 
the primary constraints, with performance both a constraint as well as an output of the 
system. The mechanisms include the actual work and application of skills to transform the 
system. Management of the diverse factors that form the process of weapons system 
development results in functional integration. Systems integration further highlights the 
systems nature of defense project management.  
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 The Systems Nature of Project Management 
We manage this system by monitoring, measuring and attempting to control cost, 
schedule, and performance. However, we often fail to meet these measures. Could it be that 
DoD projects continue to fail because our management tools consist of this limited set of 
measurement criteria? After all, the old phrase attributed to past systems thinkers and 
management experts, “what gets measured gets managed,” is as actual today as when it 
was first voiced (Willcocks & Lester, 1996). Using the same thinking, a corresponding 
phrase, “what gets measured gets done,” also rings weak in that we are certainly 
measuring, but in many cases, project success isn’t getting done. 
Further, even if the cost, schedule, and performance criteria are achieved, the only 
thing demonstrated is that we are meeting goals rather than accurately measuring success 
(Atkinson, 1999). Are meeting these criteria—cost, schedule, and performance—critical for 
success, without which the weapons system development is classified as a failure? Senior 
DoD officials routinely point out that notwithstanding cost and schedule overruns, the 
weapons systems the DoD produces are the best in the world. 
Cost, schedule, and performance were sufficient for the management of simple 
programs and, in some cases, complicated programs. Complicated programs, while 
sometimes large and consisting of many moving parts, operate in predictable ways (Sargut 
& McGrath, 2011). The operation of a weapons system, while complicated (and difficult), is 
predictable. Complex programs are different. While complex systems may operate in 
predictable ways, the interactions of elements of the complex system are unpredictable, as 
they constantly change (Sargut & McGrath, 2011). By their very nature, cost, schedule, and 
performance are metrics, and as metrics, become predictors. However, it is almost 
impossible to predict with accuracy the end state of cost, schedule, and performance in 
complex systems. 
Complexity 
Complexity is the major dynamic of weapons system development in the 21st 
Century. Complexity is ever-present, but at the same time constantly changing. The 
continued growth of complexity has changed the process and the organizations of project 
management in important ways. Managerial and technical complexity, and the resultant 
recognition of the limits of human capability, has resulted in necessary changes in both 
human and organizational capacity. From the human perspective, complexity has spawned 
specialists—experts in a particular field—able to address those smaller aspects of a 
complex system that can be handled by a single person. The need to deal with technical 
complexity while ensuring system capability is the basis for the field of systems engineering, 
among other technical specializations. 
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Specialization has a limiting function, in that the specialists in a project organization 
are measured by, and capable of addressing, only those issues in their specific area. As a 
result, the project management offices have increased in size to meet the needs of 
specialization. This has resulted in a corresponding decrease in the visibility over the entire 
project, a “can’t see the forest for the trees” analogy from the individuals’ perspective. This 
has the potential of causing a potential decrease in efficiency in the execution of the project. 
Complexity in project management refers to those organizational, informational and 
technical characteristics of the project and, by extension, the project management 
organization and the technical staff (Baccarini, 1996). Included in the organizational 
construct are the categories of stakeholders and other interested parties. Complexity has a 
direct effect on management and decisions as the more complex the system, the potentially 
more complex the management effort and decisions required. The mixture of human-socio-
political complexity found in weapons systems development offices further adds to this 
complexity (Atkinson, 1999; Pinto, 2000). Finally, complexity reduces the predictability of the 
outcome of decisions made (Sargut & McGrath, 2011). 
Definitions and explanations of complexity, managerial, engineering and 
technological abound, from Williams to Gell-Mann, to Holland, to Hughes (Gell-Mann, 1995; 
Holland, 1993; Hughes, 1998; Sargut & McGrath, 2011; Williams, 2002). From the project 
management perspective, Baccarini (1996) identifies two elements of complexity, 
organizational and technological complexity. He further subdivides these functions into 
differentiation and interdependency. Differentiation refers to the varied size and structure of 
projects and the organizations that manage them, while interdependency describes the 
activities between these varied elements (Baccarini, 1996).  
Williams builds on the Baccarini topology and defines project complexity as 
categories in two key areas, structural complexity and uncertainty (Williams, 2005). 
Structural complexity is a result of the number of elements of a project, the pieces, including 
the people, the organizations, and the technology, coupled with the way these pieces 
interact, their interdependencies. This combination of interactions of the varied elements is 
structural complexity (Williams, 2002). Williams’ (2002) second aspect of complexity is 
uncertainty of the goals and the methods necessary to reach those goals.  
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 Project Management Complexity  
(Baccarini, 1996; Sargut & McGrath, 2011; Sheard & Mostashari, 2009; Williams, 2002) 
 
Sargut and McGrath (2011) identify three properties, multiplicity, interdependence 
and diversity, as key. Multiplicity refers to the number of interacting elements or scale. This 
is similar to the Williams construct of structural complexity. Interdependence is the 
connectivity of different elements. And diversity is a measure of the difference in the 
elements (Sargut & McGrath, 2011). 
From the systems side, Sheard and Mostashari (2009) explain project complexity 
from the systems engineering perspective. That view acknowledges structural complexity, 
but adds dynamic and socio-political complexity as factors influencing complex systems 
development. Dynamic complexity recognizes the active nature, the change-over-time, of 
systems development. Socio-political complexity reflects the human side of complexity, 
focusing on the importance and challenges of social interaction in systems development, 
including the cognitive challenge complexity causes, as well as the effect of everyday 
politics.  
To allow for a more complete analysis, the complexity frameworks developed by 
Williams based on project management, by Sheard and Mostashari based on systems 
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engineering, and discussed by Sargut and McGrath based on business considerations are 
combined to illustrate project management complexity in the Department of Defense 
(Baccarini, 1996; Williams, 2002; Sargut & McGrath, 2011; Sheard & Mostashari, 2009). 
While the Sheard and Mostashari (2009) framework is focused on systems engineering, it is 
valuable because it provides an important link from engineering to project management. The 
resulting framework (Table 1) includes a topology of different kinds of structural complexity, 
uncertainty, dynamic and socio-political complexity, and overall system complexity.  
This grouping of complexity factors combines the management and engineering 
considerations in the development of weapons systems. In many cases, the resultant 
complexity is manifested in more than one type. For example, personnel issues including 
leadership changes have complexity effects in uncertainty, dynamic complexity, and socio-
political complexity. 
Structural complexity includes the scale, connectivity, organizational structure, and 
objectives of the development. Size is about magnitude of the acquisition system and its 
policies, bureaucracy and hierarchy to include the private sector side of defense acquisition. 
Connectivity acknowledges that the volume of staff actions between these organizations is 
significant and includes both issues relating to managing ongoing development. The 
connectivity aspect of structural complexity is influenced by the nature of defense acquisition 
systems. Since the technology development infrastructure (i.e., laboratories, R&D centers, 
and manufacturing) is for the most part privately owned, structural complexity also describes 
the network connectivity necessary for the system to function. Beyond the hierarchies, 
project organizations are major business entities directly controlling budgeting, spending 
and, in most cases, the award of fee to defense companies. Project organizations are 
spread throughout the United States and overseas, further adding to the complexity. Finally, 
the focus on defense project management by the DoD essentially means project 
organizations extend from the task level of the project to the highest levels of the 
bureaucracy. A recent GAO study recognized the challenges of structural complexity in 
finding the reviews for some programs include up to 56 organizations at eight levels. These 
structural requirements, reviews and responding to information requests can add up to two 
years to the development time (GAO, 2015). 
Uncertainty focuses on three major areas: budget, technical complexity, and overall 
system objectives. In defense acquisition, budget is a major concern and source of 
uncertainty because of the year-to-year budget cycle, as well as political considerations. 
Uncertainty also stems from the military rotation policy, where senior leaders change jobs 
approximately every two to three years. Most new leaders are driven to make a mark on the 
organization and may be therefore unwittingly contributing to the uncertainty of the staff. 
Technical complexity is a fact of life in defense systems, and the reality is while we plan for 
technological development, it is in fact an estimate only. As we develop systems, we learn 
more about the technologies, and are then better able to plan for schedule, and cost. 
Dynamic complexity is classified as short and long term and generally refers to 
change and time available. This concept is divided into the short and the long term because 
of the differences in perspective, as well as the universe of potential reactions to dynamic 
complexity (Sheard & Mostashari, 2009). Whether it is a tactical response to a development 
problem or an administrative response to directives, the project management system is in 
constant flux. This dynamic is a function of the diverse and always changing aspects of 
ongoing development. Further, each individual (the human element) will interpret and 
emphasize different aspects of the problem and how to address that problem. This has a 
potentially significant impact on the management system.  
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Socio-political complexity is the nexus between management, and the non-
engineering human factors of policy, process and practice of the system is most critical 
(Maier, 1995). Socio-political complexity also recognizes the politics of project management, 
starting with the budget process, through Congress, and back into the development 
organizations. An oft overlooked, but critical aspect of context is politics. In fact, politics is by 
far the most powerful factor in the category of context. Most engineers and project 
managers dismiss politics as the realm of higher-level decision makers. In fact, many refuse 
to engage in politics as they find the practice distasteful (Pinto, 2000). However, dismissing 
those political activities can have consequences. Whenever people are put in an 
organization and asked to function as a team, there is an inevitable use of power and 
political behavior (Pinto, 2000). Notwithstanding a general distaste for political behavior in 
the workplace, the reality is the practice of politics is a prime force in any weapons 
development.  
The last aspect of complexity in the context of program management is overall 
system complexity. System complexity is the result of the interaction of all the stated 
elements of project complexity. When different systems interact, or when different aspects of 
complexity act on each other, there are two results. The first is the cumulative effect of the 
interaction. For the project organization, the interdependencies between those managing the 
development and those executing the development should result in repeatable, consistent 
results—continued progress in system development (Rebovich, 2008). However, when the 
link between those managing and those executing is broken or, as can happen, ignored, the 
interdependency is broken.  
In today’s environment, the concentration of the defense project manager role on the 
program (work/scope), the technology to be developed, the interfaces of the system 
including those non-technical interfaces, and the project environment—the ecosystem of the 
development. Thus, complexity requires a different approach to project management, one 
that acknowledges the importance of managing resources (cost and schedule) to optimize 
system performance, but at the same recognizes the crucial known and unknown 
constraints and interdependencies of the environment—the context of the system 
development. 
Project Success 
Cost, schedule, and performance are both a management tool as well as a predictor 
of success. The management science discipline has sought to quantify the activities of the 
various management disciplines, including project management. Tishler et al. (1996) 
observed that in order to identify the managerial factors (and by extension the processes 
leading to those factors), success must be defined. They further cite research by Pinto and 
Slevin (1998) that definitions of success change during different phases of the lifecycle. 
A major focus of the literature on project success has been on the idea of success 
criteria, or critical success factors (CSF; Jugdev & Müller, 2005). Identified success factors 
include cost, schedule, and performance, as well as project functionality and its 
management (Morris & Hough, 1988). Further studies added criteria such as customer 
satisfaction, efficiency of execution, and effectiveness of the project organization (Pinto & 
Slevin, 1998). Tishler et al. (1996) suggest groupings of four critical success factors for 
defense oriented projects, preparation, quality of the system development team and the user 
customer organization, management policy and project control. This clustering of success 
factors represents the amalgamation of the broader literature on project success criteria 
(Atkinson, 1999; Cooke-Davies, 2002; De Wit, 1988; Morris & Hough, 1988; Pinto & Mantel, 
1990; Pinto & Slevin, 1998). 
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Preparation for project execution includes the necessary planning for initiating the 
project, as well as the necessary coordination. Included in the idea of preparation is an 
assessment of the urgency of need as urgency in defense projects overcomes many 
constraints. Team quality refers to both the management as well as technical capabilities of 
the development organization. Management policy is focused on quality, producibility, and 
design-to-cost considerations. Project control relates to the systematic use of control 
methods for cost, schedule, and performance. Together, these factors represent the criteria 
generally necessary for projects to be successful. This suggests that the exclusive and rigid 
adherence to cost, schedule, and performance as indicators of success (and the hallmark of 
defense project management) alone does not reflect the totality of success in defense 
project management. 
Most importantly, the literature identifies two kinds of success, project success and 
project management success (Cooke-Davies, 2002; De Wit, 1988; Jugdev & Müller, 2005). 
Project success is measured as achieving technical performance and/or mission 
performance goals, coupled with customer (warfighter) satisfaction (De Wit, 1988). Project 
success is measured against the overall objectives of the development (Cooke-Davies, 
2002). The nature of defense acquisition requires weapons systems that function as 
intended. This is measured in very real terms of life or death and battlefield success or 
failure. Rigid adherence to and sole focus on cost, schedule, and performance mean little if 
the system does not perform when needed (Cleland & King, 1983). In the greater scheme of 
things, what matters in defense acquisition is whether the system functions as the warfighter 
needs.  
A major, complex project’s principal success criteria will vary over time (Atkinson, 
1999; De Wit, 1988; Morris & Hough, 1988). To paraphrase de Wit (1988), defense projects 
have at least three specific indicators of success: identifying the technology, developing the 
technology, and developing the weapons system using the technology. Delivering capable 
weapons systems is project success. But, identifying the technology and developing the 
technology are also measures of project success.  
Cost, schedule, and performance measure project management success. At its 
heart, project management success is a measure of how efficiently the project has been 
managed (Baccarini, 1999). Project success is different from project management success. 
Project success will be determined by the warfighter community. 
Project management success includes overcoming issues such as supply-chain 
challenges and effective coordination within the project management office. Project 
management success is focused on the development process. The DoD, the GAO, and 
Congress measure project management success, rather than project success. Project 
management success, however, is and must remain subordinate to project success. Cost, 
schedule, and performance are inadequate indicators even for project management 
success. 
Context, the Fourth Criterion  
The factors of complexity identified in Table 1 provide a starting point for 
identification of factors that are beyond the basics of cost, schedule, and performance, yet 
influence project and project management success. From a systems perspective, execution 
of weapons system development must be considered from the viewpoint of all stakeholders 
(Owens et al., 2011). This viewpoint includes an appreciation of the identified elements of 
complexity, including structure, uncertainty, dynamics, socio-political and system. These 
factors of complexity constantly shape the project environment and form the basis of the 
context of the system within which the project manager must operate. We group these 
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complexity factors that are the result of the execution of a project together and define them 
as context (Owens et al., 2011). 
Context includes those project organization activities that are essential to administer 
programs, but are not directly related to the cost, schedule, and performance of the project. 
Context ranges from tracking budget requests through the bureaucracy to responding to 
stakeholder inquiries on how resources are being used. In weapons system development, 
context includes those activities that, while not tied directly to cost, schedule, and 
performance, are essential for execution.  
Each project is unique, a mix of many factors. More than cost, schedule, and 
performance, context reflects the ecosystem of the project organization and the project. If 
cost, schedule, and performance are measures and criteria for project management 
success, context is a criterion for project success. 
The goal of this paper was to explore the concept of cost, schedule, and 
performance to determine if these three quintessential project management criteria were 
sufficient to serve as the guiding principles for defense project managers. The ever 
increasing complexity of the weapons system development environment, from the necessity 
for specialization to the intricacies of new technology, requires a broader view than that 
offered by cost, schedule, and performance. In squaring the project management circle, we 
must add as fourth variable, context, to provide focus because if we measure it, it will get 
done. 
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